Philosophers distinguish between natural kinds (e.g. tiger, rip tide, vulcano) and social kinds (e.g. money, marriage, age of majority). We have little control over the former (except for classifying them); we simply encounter them (in nature). Social kinds, on the other hand, are constructed by us. We made up the kind ‘age of majority’ (you will not find it in nature) and we can, for example, change the age of majority from 21 to 18, we have control over it. But we can’t change the roar of a tiger, or to make it sound like a pussy-cat. In contrast, we have changed the social kind ‘marriage’ to include same-sex couples.
Professor John Brewer, professor of applied sport science at St Mary’s University, told BBC Radio 5 Live: “Whether we like it or not, genetically the very best males will nearly always beat the very best females in most sports where physicality is critical.
“If you have those physical and physiological characteristics of a male athlete and you are competing in a female environment, then you will inevitably do extremely well and have an advantage.”
Brewer says males “tend to have more testosterone” that stimulates muscle growth and their “legacy physiology” (larger heart and lungs) does not necessarily change despite the transition process.
He added: “So, inevitably, when you go into high-performance sport, where the difference between success and failure is quite small, that ‘legacy physiology’ alongside the muscle growth testosterone creates will give, almost inevitably, transgender athletes/individuals a physiological and indeed a performance advantage.”
“These monologues are not representative of the experiences of all women, or all individuals with vaginas,” the directors affirmed. “Instead, they are representative of the 200+ women that Eve Ensler interviewed twenty years ago.”
The directors gave the show a modified title: “The Vagina* Monologues.” The event description came with the caveat that “*people of all genders have vaginas and these monologues represent a small segment of that population.”
“Is it now a crime to like a poem about transgenderism?” by James Kirkup [The Spectator]
This is a story about Harry Miller, a man who has lived a life that might be described as blameless and even admirable. He’s the director of a company that employs 70-odd people in one of the poorer bits of England, invests in its staff and community, and uses its financial and technical expertise to raise large sums of money and make life better for people who really need it in very poor parts of Nepal.
Miller, a former police officer, is not frankly, the sort of person you’d expect to the subject of a police inquiry. Yet according to Miller on Wednesday this week, he found himself answering questions — for 34 minutes – from an officer from Humberside Police. He doesn’t live in Humberside, incidentally, and nor is his business based there.
What could this mean? The above statement is frequently asserted or contradicted in the debate between some feminists [1] and some trans people[2] . Germaine Greer is quoted as saying: “A trans woman is not a woman.” The novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie said in a Channel 4 News interview (2017): “A trans woman is a trans woman”. There is clearly a dispute about what is meant, or what could be meant, by the term ‘trans woman’ (as well as the term ‘woman’), and this is what I want to explore here. For the sake of disclosure, I am neither a woman nor a trans woman; I started out as a boy and I have been a man for a while now.
Let us start by addressing the issue of spelling: ‘trans woman’, ‘trans-woman’, ‘transwoman’. In the first variation ‘trans’ is an adjective which qualifies the noun ‘woman’. The second and third spellings are compound nouns, and they imply the existence of a class (trans-woman/transwoman) that has members which fall under this class – and which, presumably, is in contrast to the classes of ‘woman’, ‘man’ and ‘trans-man/transman’. I will ignore the compound nouns for now and work with the first variation: ‘trans woman’.
Are we dealing with an analytic or a synthetic statement[3]? An analytic statement is necessarily true (on logical grounds), because the predicate explicates what is already contained in the subject. A bachelor is an unmarried man – is true by definition. We can know this truth by remaining in our philosophical armchair; there is no need to go out into the world and to explore. This particular analytic truth is a tautology, and we can reverse subject and predicate and the statement is still true: An unmarried man is a bachelor. Let’s try this test: A woman is a trans woman. This doesn’t seem right; it’s not tautological. Not all women are trans women. Or perhaps it would be better to say that not all women would make the claim that they are trans women.
Here’s a non-tautological analytic statement: A cardiologist is a doctor. If we reverse subject and predicate here (A doctor is a cardiologist.) the statement would be false. Is the statement in my essay title a non-tautological analytic truth? That is highly unlikely because people can and do dispute it – as Germaine Greer did. There doesn’t seem to be a logical contradiction in doing so. It appears then that the predicate term (‘woman’) doesn’t explicate what is already contained in the subject (‘trans woman’). This seems odd because we have the term ‘woman’ in both the subject and the predicate. But we can put aside such worry when we think about statements like: A bearded man is a man.
Thus, the statement in question must be synthetic, i.e. its truth depends on how things are in the world[4]. It would be an empirical truth, rather that a truth dependent on definitions. Its truth is not self-evident like in the statement: A triangle has three sides, neither is its falsity self-evident as in the statement: A square has five sides.
Let us now look at the adjective ‘trans’. It derives from the Latin: across, over, beyond. Thus a trans woman has moved, i.e. trans-itioned, from being (or being perceived as) a man, wishes to move, or is in the process of moving. At some point in time the now ‘trans woman’ was (perceived) by herself and/or others as being a boy/man. The meaning of our statement in question might then be:
Although I was perceived as a boy/man before, I am a woman now.
“A TRANS WOMAN IS A TRANS WOMAN”
The novelist and feminist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie said in a Channel 4 News interview (2017): “A trans woman is a trans woman”. What did she mean by this? Adichie’s claim looks like a tautology, no different from: A horse is a horse or A rose is a rose. Adichie didn’t merely intend to make a trivial statement. She elaborates in the interview: ‘if you have lived in the world as a man, with the privileges that the world accords to men’ then it is difficult to accept that ‘we can equate your experience with the experience of a woman who has lived from the beginning in the world of the woman and who has not been accorded those privileges that men are’.
Let us elaborate on Adichie’s point. We could characterise the different experience of a trans woman as follows: before transitioning you were perceived to be male and you were treated as a male. This has given you a different socialisation, in contrast to the socialisation of a female. For example, you were not routinely made to feel that boys are more important and more capable. You were not made to feel stupid by boys/men so that they could feel superior. You were not taught to be passive. You didn’t have period pains. You lack the reproductive organs to give birth. You didn’t experience the threat and/or reality of sexual harassment or sexual assault by men – because of your female biology. You may (believe that you) feel like a woman, but because of your socialisation, combined with your original biology, you are a trans woman.
WOMEN’S SAFE SPACES – AND THE LABOUR PARTY
There is a war over words being waged between radical or gender critical feminists (but also members of MUMSNET and other groups/individuals) on one side and trans activists on the other. There are also insults being traded (TIMs and TERFs) – but, as we know, ad hominem attacks don’t get us anywhere.
The bone of contention is ostensibly the word ‘woman’. The former deny that a trans woman is a woman, the latter affirm the statement. Note that not all trans women want to be classed as women and not all women deny the claim. But let’s ignore this and concentrate on those who do.
The law (Gender Recognition Act 2004) makes provision for people to change their gender status, but this requires that they produce various forms of evidence (medical reports, living in their preferred gender for two years, etc.). Some trans people reject these legal requirements as oppressive, because this ‘medicalised approach pathologises trans identities’ (Miller-Report 2016: 3). Furthermore, not everyone aims to pass as a woman.
There is a new understanding of gender and what it means to be a woman among some trans people. ‘Trans identities take a wide diversity of forms’ (Miller-Report 2016: 5). You may look like a ‘man’ but feel and be a woman inside. Or you may sport a Karl-Marx-type beard and show off your breasts at the same time and assert that you are a woman. A transgender woman might want to be registered as the mother of her children although she ‘fathered’ them – in tradition parlance. Thus, the transgender conception of woman (for some activists) differs from the hetero-normative idea of what it is to be a woman.
The government is looking to change the current legislation (see the ‘Miller-Report’ 2016), presumably in order to reflect the changed social reality. One of the proposals being discussed is that self-declaration as a woman (or man) would suffice in order to change your gender. Thus, there would be no more pressure on transgender people to conform to the medicalised tests and to strive to pass as a woman (or man). Some might want to change sex (i.e. a medical intervention), some might not but would still want to pass as a woman, and some might not want to pass at all. Under the proposed legislation, no matter what their gender presentation might be, they could all claim to be a woman. It is obvious how transgender people see the proposed legislation as liberating. Note that many transsexuals do not like the idea of trans people not ‘transitioning’ – there are divisions in the trans community about this isssue.
At present the ‘exemption clause’ in the Equality Act 2010 permits women-only spaces. This means that ‘discrimination’ (i.e. drawing a distinction) can be lawful when it has a legitimate aim – here, to protect someone on the grounds of their sex. For example, it is lawful for a local authority to fund a women-only refuge.
But trans women could be excluded from women-only spaces. Here is an example from the Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010 (p. 157):
‘A group counselling session is provided for female victims of sexual assault. The organisers do not allow transsexual people to attend as they judge that the clients who attend the group session are unlikely to do so if a male-to-female transsexual person was also there. This would be lawful.’
Why do some women/feminists object to the proposed legislation? If it only takes a self-declaration to become a trans woman, then they will have access to women only spaces. Allowing trans people, who may or may not look like men, into their safe spaces (e.g. public toilets, changing rooms, women’s refuges, rape crisis centres, homeless shelters, hospital wards, female swimming sessions, group counselling sessions for female victims of sexual assault – but also female prisons) could cause alarm, distress or fear.
The Barrister advising the Miller Committee, Claire McCann, commented specifically on the example from the Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010 and stated that (Miller-Report: 30) ‘this example is drafted too categorically’. And the Committee members have followed this view (Section 132):
‘These are sensitive areas, where there does need to be some limited ability to exercise discretion, if this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. However, we are not persuaded that this discretion should apply where a trans person has been recognised as of their acquired gender “for all legal purposes” under the Gender Recognition Act. In many instances this is unlikely, in any case, to meet the proportionate test.’
The example from the 2010 explanatory notes (a group counselling session is provided for female victims of sexual assault) appears to be the strongest case for excluding trans women from a women-only space. But the Miller Report indicates that the committee believed that even in such a case an exclusion of trans women might not be appropriate. Their rationale presumably is that if the law recognises a trans person as a woman, ‘for all legal purposes’, then all spaces which were hitherto reserved for women must be open to trans women as well.
There is another issue which is closely connected with the erosion of the provisions in the Equality Act 2010. There is real concern that men (let’s use the Labour Party as an example) make decisions about women’s hard-fought-for spaces by allowing trans women onto all-women shortlists (there has been no consultation on this within the Labour party) or by allowing trans women to stand as women’s officers.
It is likely that men still dominate the debate within the Labour party and by making decisions about women’s spaces or all-women shortlists the access to opportunities for women is reduced. Thus, the lived experience of women is that the wheel is being turned back, that male politicians – again – curtail their opportunities in life. Furthermore, this reality is being re-enforced by trans activists who exhibit an entitlement attitude – reminiscent of male attitudes – to such spaces and opportunities. Strangely, trans men remain very much in the background in the public debate; trans women appear to be more pushy. Some feminists’ explain the greater prominence of trans women, compared to trans men, by pointing to their male privileged upbringing. The quality and tone of the interactions from some trans activists is equally reminiscent of male misogyny: a case where a woman was assaulted by trans activists lead to a conviction, and on social media it is common to read: ‘punch TERFS!’
The Labour party has actually jumped the (legislative) gun by declaring that trans women are welcome to stand without a Gender Recognition Certificate. This decision is about to be challenged in court. I suspect that the Labour Party will lose because, as the law stands, a trans person would need a GRC in order to be recognised as a woman. However, according to Dawn Butler, Labour’s Shadow Secretary of State for Women and Equalities, trans women may simply self-certify as women.
Both women and trans women (or trans men) are protected groups in society. When it comes to women’s safe spaces or women-only spaces their interests seem to clash. As of 2002 there is legislation which allows for all-women shortlists for parliamentary seats (this has raised the number of female MPs). Allowing trans women accesss to women-only shortlists reduces the opportunities for natal women.
Women feel under attack – sometimes literally. Some trans activists act as if the demands of trans women are self-evidently justified and therefore trump – without the need for a critical debate – the concerns of women. As a result these real worries of women are dismissed by describing their objections as transphobic, hate speech or exclusionary. However, it is a mistake to believe that the demands of one group in society automatically overrule the concerns of another group in society without allowing for a critical debate to take place.
Women commonly experience sexual harassment and violence from men. It is therefore understandable that they resent the idea of opening up their safe spaces to people who may have male genitalia, exhibit some male features, or who present as males. As a result they wouldn’t feel safe anymore. Another worry is that, once self-declaration becomes a reality (as it is already in the Labour Party), people with sinister motives [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-44877856] might enter these safe places, and in some instances non-trans men would be indistinguishable from trans women. Here we have to weigh up whose interests are more important and who could experience greater harm. I submit that the fear and anxiety of women about these issues, their lived experience, cannot be brushed aside as mere ‘transphobia’.
A TRANS WOMAN – IN POSSESSION OF A GRC – IS A WOMAN
The debate about whether a trans woman is a woman is a red herring. In the eyes of the law a trans woman – in possession of a GRC – is a woman, and this is what counts practically. What either group think about each other is a private matter and the law doesn’t try to interfere in such matters. The GRA 2004 declared that trans women are women, and no biological essentialism (trans women versus natal women), nor any metaphysical speculation (what is the essence of being a woman?) can change this.
The real issue is whether the exclusion clause in the Equality Act 2010 will have the same scope in the new legislation or whether it will be scrapped altogether. This clause allows for exemptions in order to protect certain groups in society. For example, at present it would be lawful to exclude a trans woman from attending a group session for female victims of sexual assault. Looking at the Miller Report (2016), it appears that the government will favour the interests of trans women (not to be excluded) over the interests of natal women.
Notes
1. Also known as ‘gender critical’ or ‘radical’ feminists. I want to make my task easier by just referring to feminists without having to discuss the implications of these adjectives.
2. Not all trans people subscribe to the view that a trans woman is a woman, and not all women deny it.
3. In the Kantian sense (1781, A 6-7). In spite of Quine’s (1951) attack on the synthetic-analytic distinction, I use these terms as a heuristic device; also see Sober (2000) on Quine.
4. Let us ignore synthetic a priori truths.
Miroslav Imbrisevic 